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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The work of the Polish-Russian scholar Leon Petrażycki from the early decades of the twentieth 
century holds a strikingly paradoxical position in the literature of juristic and socio-legal 
scholarship: on the one hand, lauded as a supremely valuable contribution to knowledge about the 
nature of law and, on the other, widely neglected and little known. This article asks how far 
Petrażycki’s theories, expressed in writings by and about him available to an international 
readership, can provide insight for contemporary socio-legal studies – not as historical 
background but as living ideas. How far can his work speak to current issues and inform current 
debates? What obstacles stand in the way of this? Why have few international scholars engaged 
with his theories despite their rigour and originality? The article starts from this last issue before 
addressing the others. It argues that Petrażycki’s radical legal theory offers strikingly distinctive 
resources for rethinking issues about the role of law in multicultural societies, the nature of 
developing transnational law, and the significance of law as an aspect or expression of culture. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The work of the Polish-Russian scholar Leon Petrażycki from the early decades of the twentieth 
century holds a strikingly paradoxical position in the literature of juristic and socio-legal scholarship. 
Indeed, the polarisation between available indicators of its status – on the one hand, lauded as a 
supremely valuable contribution to knowledge about the nature of law and, on the other, widely 
neglected and little known – may be the most extreme in modern legal theory.  
 
                                                     

 Anniversary Professor of Legal Theory, Queen Mary University of London, UK. This is a revised and much 
expanded version of a paper presented at Saint Petersburg State University in 2013 and subsequently published 
in Russian translation in that university’s jurisprudence review. I have benefited greatly from discussions with 
Krzysztof Motyka, Edoardo Fittipaldi and Adam Bosiacki. 
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It is true that ‘past and ever new generations of scholars have been drawn to his heritage’ (Kojder, 
2006, p. 333). Almost all who have devoted serious study to his writings, – and there have been very 
many throughout the century since they were produced – hold them in high respect. He was called 
‘possibly the greatest scholar of law in the twentieth century’ by one of his leading followers at that 
century’s mid-point (Sorokin, 1950, p. 322), his work ‘unexcelled, even hardly rivalled, by any other 
theory of law and ethics’ in that era (Sorokin, 1956, p. 1150). Reading Petrażycki’s available writings 
carefully today, it is hard not to be dazzled by the ambition, imagination and perceptiveness of his 
thinking and its rigour over an unusually vast intellectual terrain.  
 
He offers not only a systematic and intricate legal theory, utterly different from those that now 
dominate juristic thought, but also an original system of psychology to underpin it.
1
 In addition he 
provides a blueprint for a new policy science to direct legislation far beyond its usual pragmatic 
objectives. In doing this he also looks back to identify long-term, scientifically-explicable, historical 
tendencies of legal development and he looks forward with a morally rich vision of what a truly 
civilised society of the future might be. He provides many subtle, psychologically-informed insights 
into the relations of law and morality. And he clearly foreshadows contemporary concerns with legal 
pluralism, developing one of the most elaborate discussions of this phenomenon in the literature of 
legal thought. Finally, his distinctive ideas on the nature of social science, developed mainly in 
unpublished manuscripts and in his teaching, have been publicised by his followers.  
 
Yet this vast intellectual project has not attracted the scale of international interest one might expect. 
Petrażycki’s contribution to the study of law and society has justifiably been called ‘unrecognised’ 
(Gella, 1977; Podgórecki, 1980-1) and in international debates in socio-legal studies (systematic, 
empirically-oriented studies of law as a social phenomenon) his name is hardly mentioned. His 
theories are entirely unknown to most jurists and socio-legal scholars in the English-speaking world.
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He surely belongs to the intellectual cultures of the main countries where he pursued his career – 
Russia (in St Petersburg between 1898 and 1918) and subsequently Poland (in Warsaw until his death 
in 1931). But he does not yet belong to the intellectual cultures of the Anglophone countries where 
socio-legal inquiries have notably flourished in the past half century.  
 
                                                     
1
 Edoardo Fittipaldi (2012, p. 14) sees Petrażycki as adopting ‘a typical 19th-century psychology that is hardly 
compatible with the research that has been done’ since his time. But he considers that this in no way prevents 
productive use of Petrażycki’s ideas about law and his book is an elaborate attempt at developing them. On one 
view (Walicki, 1967/1992, p. 236), since Petrażycki’s method has ‘very little in common with the methods of 
empirical psychology… it would be more proper to emphasise its closeness to phenomenology’. 
2
 On the Western reception of Petrażycki’s ideas see Kojder (2006, pp. 346-9). For rare recent discussions see 
Treviño (2013), Deflem (2008, pp. 78-89), Banakar (2002). Fittipaldi (2012) is an elaborate study of legal 
ontology developed from Petrażycki’s ideas. 
3 
 
It has been suggested that ‘literature about Petrażycki is scarce’ (Peczenik, 1975, p. 86) but this is a 
strange comment. It is true that much of his writing is available only in Russian or Polish, so scholars 
not having access to these languages cannot hope to evaluate his work in any comprehensive way. But 
they can hardly be excused for remaining ignorant of his main ideas.
3
 Even though the only work by 
Petrażycki easily available in English is Hugh Babb’s translation (Petrażycki, 1955), published in 
1955, of approximately one fifth of his two primary Russian works (Sorokin, 1956, p. 1150), Russian 
and Polish scholars have written extensively in English and other languages explaining Petrazycki’ s 
ideas. Nevertheless, the literature of commentary is very scattered. Often it devotes much space to re-
iterating the central elements of Petrażycki’s thought. This ceaseless repetition seems necessary 
because, even after much effort over many decades up to the present day, the ideas are still not 
internationally established.  
 
This article asks how far Petrażycki’s theories, as expressed in writings by and about him available to 
an international readership, might provide insight for contemporary socio-legal studies – not as 
historical background but as living ideas. What aspects of his work can speak to major current issues 
and inform current debates? What obstacles stand in the way of this? In trying to answer these 
questions it is also necessary to ask why most international scholars have been deterred from engaging 
with his theoretical legacy. The article starts from this last issue before addressing the others. 
 
 
PETRAŻYCKI IN THE WORLD OF JURISTS 
 
Since the centre of Petrażycki’s work is a theory of law it might be assumed that its best prospects of 
exerting influence would be in the juristic world – the world of lawyers’ speculations on and 
rationalisations of their professional field. But some brief comments on his legal theory may show 
why its socio-legal rather than juristic significance seems ultimately most important to explore at the 
present time (though these two kinds of significance should not be seen as mutually exclusive).  
 
Petrażycki was determined to produce a scientifically adequate theory of law. An adequate theory, in 
his view, is one that holds true for all phenomena in the class of phenomena to which it is said to 
apply, but not to others outside the class (Kotarbiński, 1975). Such a theory requires that law be 
rigorously conceptualised to indicate such a class. Arguing that all juristic conceptualisations of law 
(e.g. as the will of the state, or the law applied by courts or other official agencies) fail in this respect, 
Petrażycki conceptualises law in a radically different way, as something that exists only in the mind. 
                                                     
3
 Translation of more of Petrażycki’s work into English would certainly be valuable, especially if the selections 
from it were made with a socio-legal (rather than specifically legal philosophical) readership in mind; the main 
foci of Anglophone legal philosophy are surely now far removed from his concerns. 
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It is a particular kind of mental experience or impulsion, a bilateral (active-passive) experience that is 
distinctively imperative-attributive. That is to say, every individual experience of law combines an 
active (attributive) element of right or entitlement and a passive (imperative) element of obligation or 
duty (Petrażycki, 1955, p. 47). Law is distinguished from morality in that in the latter only the 
imperative element of duty and not the attributive element of right is present.  
 
Law as a purely mental experience has no objective observable reality; it remains the subjective 
experience of each individual. But by a psychological process of projection this experience is often 
‘externalised’ so that it is understood by individuals as a norm somehow standing apart from them and 
acting on them, as if from outside. Strictly speaking, then, all normative expressions of law (such as 
statutes, judicial decisions and other legal phenomena studied by jurists) are just mental experiences 
‘projected outwards and viewed as objective reality’ (Rudzinski, 1976, p. 111). They are ‘phantasms’. 
However, where for various reasons these projections tend to become uniform (so that they are widely 
shared by many individuals) they begin to appear as a social reality, not just a subjective experience 
of each individual. The projections themselves are then often thought of as law, in the form of norms. 
 
Often, but certainly not always, the mental experience of law refers to ‘some authority or reason 
outside that experience itself’ (Northrop, 1959, p. 87) which Petrażycki calls a normative fact. Such 
facts can include any sources of authority that the individual recognises. These give content to 
psychological experiences of law, fixing the sense of right and duty. Law derived from the 
individual’s acceptance of normative facts, Petrażycki calls positive law, but it is important to 
recognise that this is not what lawyers typically understand as positive law. For one thing, normative 
facts can encompass much more than juristically recognised sources of law (legislation, judicial 
decisions, etc.); they may not have any ‘official’ character or any acceptance by the state as legally 
significant. For another, normative facts have legal significance only as elements in the individual’s 
mental experience of law.  
 
So – in a claim that must have bewildered many of his lawyer readers – he notes that normative facts 
can be purely imaginary: a contract with the Devil may be a normative fact that operates to determine 
the ethical impulsions of someone who believes in its existence. Where these impulsions are 
imperative-attributive they are examples of law. Indeed, following Petrażycki’s theory, ‘one wood-
goblin may make a contract with another’ (Babb, 1938, p. 518; cf. Petrażycki, 1955, p. 83). Law that 
is unrelated to normative facts, Petrażycki calls intuitive law. In this case the experience of right and 
duty arises directly in the individual’s mind unmediated by some accepted authority, so intuitive law 
encompasses the sense of justice (which may or may not correspond with positive law). Thus, 
Petrażycki makes justice, as a sense of entitlement and obligation, a kind of law existing intuitively in 
the citizen’s mind. Justice ‘is nothing but intuitive law in our sense’ (1955, p. 241). So law as a class 
5 
 
encompasses all imperative-attributive experiences without exception. As one writer notes, this 
definition of law is ‘arguably the widest… ever proposed’ (Motyka, 2007, p. 34).4  
 
It would seem at this point as though Petrażycki’s theory has few direct links to juristic thought.5 The 
distinction between what (positive) law is and what it ought to be (justice), which is at the base of 
modern positivist jurisprudence, is brought inside the Petrażyckian concept of law. And even positive 
law seems to be merely a mental experience rather than the objective datum that jurists study.  
 
Matters seem to be made only worse when, alongside the positive-intuitive distinction, Petrażycki 
introduces an entirely different one between official and unofficial law. Official law is the law ‘which 
is to be applied and sustained by representatives of the state authority in accordance with their duty to 
serve society’ (1955, p. 139). So, at least here, we are clearly addressing the law of jurists. However, 
there is also unofficial law ‘which does not possess this significance in the state’.  Petrażycki seems to 
be identifying official law as an objective social reality (the state representatives and their use of law 
can be generally observed) and this makes it a phenomenon that jurists can recognise as their normal 
province of law. However, the idea of unofficial law, which Petrażycki defines only negatively, 
indicates vast horizons of ‘law’ (such as the internal regulation of families and of organisations and 
associations of all kinds) which jurists would typically not recognise as such.  
 
With the notion of unofficial law, Petrażycki confronts state law with a radical legal pluralism – 
indicating types of regulation that from some standpoints (sociological, non-juristic) can be 
considered as law but from others (those of state representatives) cannot. So he puts at the heart of his 
work the idea, often juristically disturbing, of a plurality of effective regulatory regimes co-existing in 
the same place and time, with the possibility of a diversity of determinants of their relative authority. 
 
These characteristics of Petrażycki’s theory surely show why it has been resisted by most jurists who 
have studied it. As a descriptive account of law it avoids normative evaluation. Hence it recognises 
law in each of the four categories it identifies and in their combinations. It makes no judgment about 
the general value or validity of any of these kinds of law, treating this as a matter for decision in 
particular contexts. But such valuations are juristically fundamental. So it seems that it inhabits a 
different intellectual terrain from the juristic one. This is so, even though it contains many juristically 
relevant insights, especially in its reflections on the law-morality distinction and in arguments about 
the unifying tendencies of law, the various kinds of sanctioning of law and their development, the 
                                                     
4
 It has even been claimed that Petrażycki’s concept of law is ‘so comprehensive that it contained all human and 
social phenomena’ (Gella, 1977, p. 76) but this is to miss its specific analytical focus and purpose. 
5
 Walicki (1967/1992, p. 216) notes that ‘he was often accused of representing an anti-juridical approach, 
dissolving law in the vast variety of socio-psychological phenomena; on the other hand… he saw law as 
virtually omnipresent in human life….’ 
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significance of intention and motive in law, the place of third party intervention in legal disputes, and 
the role of law in economic life and in the emergence of structures of political authority. 
 
 
PETRAŻYCKI’S RECEPTION AMONG SOCIOLOGISTS OF LAW 
 
In the light of this, the prospects for drawing productively on Petrażycki’s legal studies today might 
seem greatest in fields of research not tied to juristic concerns but aimed at studying the nature of law 
empirically as a social phenomenon, using the resources of social science. After all, his aim, as has 
been seen, was to develop a scientific explanatory theory of law and he came to recognise the 
importance of sociological theory and a sociological approach to law (Lande, 1975; Pałecki, 1984; 
Walicki, 1967/1992, pp. 245-51). But obstacles seem to have existed and they can best be identified 
by noting how the three most prominent Western sociologists of law who have been deeply influenced 
by Petrażycki and who have tried to apply his ideas have felt the need to modify or supplement them. 
It is significant that each of these scholars (Pitirim Sorokin and Nicholas Timasheff in the United 
States, Georges Gurvitch in France), as Russian speakers and former students or colleagues of 
Petrażycki in St Petersburg, had exceptional access to his teachings.  
 
Both Gurvitch and Sorokin addressed the question of whether Petrażycki’s psychological theory of 
law could give rise to an appropriately sociological perspective. Sorokin felt the need to defend 
Petrażycki against criticisms of the ‘alleged one-sidedness’ of his theory in confining the reality of 
law to psychological experience and ‘its alleged neglect of the objective social form’ of this reality by 
treating it as a mere projection or phantasm (Sorokin, 1956, p. 1153). Sorokin insisted that ‘Petrażycki 
deals with trans-subjective, social forms of law as a reality’ and he summarised how this reality arises: 
the projection of mental experiences as norms allows them to be ‘objectified’ or ‘externalised’; they 
can then be communicated (in speech, writing, etc.); through such communication they can ‘become 
diffused among many individuals and groups’ and take on ‘a sociocultural form’ (1956, pp. 1155-6). 
 
Indeed, Petrażycki writes that the inevitable and potentially dangerous conflicts arising between 
individuals’ different personal sense of rights and duties make harmonisation among them essential. 
In the face of such conflict or the threat of it, they cannot remain purely subjective experiences of 
each individual. They have somehow to become trans-subjective, so that they are shared and take on a 
social character. Differences between individuals’ mental experiences of law have to be removed. On 
this basis, generally recognised positive law and official law may develop and large structures of 
social and political life (such as the state and its agencies) arise (Petrażycki, 1955, pp. 112-13, 129-
37) as what we might call a crystallisation of harmonised individual legal experiences to form a 
sociocultural reality. Thus ‘objective’ socio-legal phenomena emerge from their origins as purely 
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individual mental phenomena. In emphasing such ideas, Sorokin notes that he draws on Petrażycki’s 
writings, on his teaching in St Petersburg (which Sorokin experienced) and on unpublished writings. 
All of which is a reminder of the fact that much of what Petrażycki wrote on sociology was not 
published and no longer survives. 
 
Elsewhere Sorokin was more critical of Petrażycki. He claimed that the theory did not explain why 
people have particular law-convictions, why some such convictions prevail in certain groups but are 
absent in others, and why in a complex society only some law-convictions become official law while 
others are suppressed and persecuted. If the state’s power only exists in the law-convictions of its 
subjects, why do people continue to accept state authority which they despise? How and why do only 
a few people determine what official law is? He thought that ‘the law-factor appears principally as a 
mere channel through which numerous non-law forces find their aggregate outlet’ and that the power 
of these forces is what determines law’s power (Sorokin, 1928, pp. 704-5). In other words, there was 
much that the psychological theory of law and state could not explain but that sociology had to 
address.  
 
Later, however, Sorokin restated the essence of Petrażycki’s legal theory in his own sociological 
terms, emphasising the ‘objective’ social reality of what he called law-norms and seeing these as ‘the 
skeleton, the heart and the soul’ of every organised group calling forth ‘a government-power’ within it 
to enforce them (Sorokin, 1947, pp. 677, 679). Thus, for Sorokin, official law is seen not (as by 
Petrażycki) merely as the law administered by state authorities. It is the primary law of any organised 
group, backed by the coercive power of the group or its governing agents. Thus, an attempt is made to 
retain the idea of norms as grounded in law-convictions but to foreground the need to analyse them 
sociologically as instruments of power and control. At the same time Petrażycki’s commitment to a 
radical legal pluralism is maintained because law is found in every organised group and pervades all 
social life. 
 
Gurvitch accepted (like Sorokin) the psychological basis of law in imperative-attributive experiences 
but insisted that law’s thoroughly social character had to be emphasised in a way that he thought 
Petrażycki had failed to do. Seeing legal experience as ‘necessarily collective experience’ (1947, p. 
45. Emphasis in original), Gurvitch treats it ‘as the convergent recognition of values by group 
members’, thereby overcoming Petrażycki’s ‘principal shortcoming… the treatment of law as a 
phenomenon of individual conscousness’ (Timasheff, 1955, p. xxxiii). Thus, contrary to Petrażycki’s 
view, all law must be positive (in Petrażycki’s sense) and the normative facts on which it relied have 
to ‘really exist and incarnate spiritual values’; they must be an ‘objective social reality’; in this way all 
8 
 
‘subjectivism’ is abolished from the theory;6 all kinds of law are fully social phenomena, none exists 
only in individual mental experiences. No place for the contracts of wood-goblins in this view of law. 
Gurvitch (1931, p. 292) saw Petrażycki’s ‘psychological individualism’ as having led him to accept 
too wide a range of normative facts (including many having no social significance) as legally relevant. 
It was the necessary positivity of law that brought together authority and regulatory effectiveness in a 
specific social milieu.  
 
Thus, while Sorokin thought that the observable socio-legal phenomena that sociology of law can 
study arose from individual law-convictions as Petrażycki envisaged, Gurvitch considered it 
necessary to depart decisively from Petrażycki to insist that all law-convictions ab initio have an 
inbuilt social element. But he went on to build on Petrażycki’s rejection of the juristic view that 
nothing can be law unless it is  recognised as such by the state, enthusiastically accepting that many 
other kinds of law exist.  
 
The radical legal pluralism of Petrażycki, Sorokin and especially Gurvitch (who identified 
sociologically a vast array of types of law) surely has the great advantage of giving socio-legal 
scholarship ways of thinking about law that are entirely independent of juristic concepts. Thus, 
sociological approaches to legal inquiry are not limited by any juristic or ‘official’ demarcation of 
law’s scope. But, in fact, socio-legal studies have often been content to accept lawyers’ assumptions 
about this scope, perhaps on the basis that it is realistic to recognise the dominance of state law and 
the practical power of state agencies (legislatures, courts, etc.) to determine conclusively what is to 
count as law. Timasheff’s sociology of law reflects this thinking (Schiff, 1981, p. 405). He advocates 
‘a narrower concept of law’ than Petrażycki’s to ‘emphasize enforcement by politically organised 
society’ and he sees ‘no cogent reason to consider [as] legal all social phenomena in which rights and 
duties are involved’ (Timasheff, 1955, p. xxxvii). For Timasheff, the task of sociology of law is to 
study how behaviour is determined by legal norms, treating law as the intersection of social power 
and ethics, represented in complex modern societies by state law (see Timasheff, 1939/1974).  
 
These various ideas of Petrażycki’s admirers are of interest as well-documented but rare attempts not 
only to engage directly with his theory but also to relate it explicitly to the concerns of socio-legal 
research. Taken together they suggest problems, or at least ambiguities or absences, in the theory. But 
it is important to note also that the work of these three followers of Petrażycki is now also neglected 
in Anglophone socio-legal scholarship. Their work is not much read and socio-legal studies are the 
poorer as a consequence. 
 
                                                     
6
 Gurvitch, 1931, p. 292; 1935, p. 166; 1947, pp. 45-6, 75. 
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This situation points to a larger issue. The task of purely conceptual legal analysis (the effort to 
specify rigorously a coherent scientific concept of law), which Sorokin, Gurvitch and Timasheff 
perhaps inherited from Petrażycki, was pursued by them in different ways as a fundamental part of 
sociology of law. But, in general, socio-legal researchers today leave the task of formulating a concept 
of law to jurists and philosophers of law. They do not typically see a need to develop rigorous 
definitions of law and finely delineated categories of law – scientifically ‘adequate’ concepts in 
Petrażycki’s sense. Instead they tend either to adopt juristic demarcations of the sphere of ‘the legal’, 
or to use provisional, pragmatic notions of law that are sufficient for their particular projects of 
research. The often elaborate classifications of types of law (almost entirely distinct from juristic 
classifications) produced by the Petrażyckian sociologists tend to appear merely formalistic to 
contemporary socio-legal researchers, whose focus, in any case, is much more likely to be on social 
action and process. Petrażyckian conceptual analysis is not part of the main agenda of socio-legal 
scholarship today. 
 
Surely this current orientation with its rejection of formalism has much merit. Socio-legal studies 
should not pay excessive attention, for example, to the project of many contemporary legal 
philosophers of trying to elaborate a universal, timeless definition of law, or a concept that will 
conclusively mark off the legal realm from the rest of social experience; presenting some ‘perfect’ 
philosophical understanding of the essential nature of the legal. Socio-legal inquiries do not need any 
such project. They need only flexible frameworks for analysis and provisional models of law, working 
conceptions that lend themselves to revision and adaptation as the task of studying changing forms of 
regulation and their sources and consequences proceeds.  
 
Today, the classic Petrazyckian sociologists of law can best be seen as having provided conceptual 
maps of legal experience as they recognised it. These maps should not be taken as ends in themselves 
(as comprehensive theories or ‘true’ understandings of the nature of law) but as suggestions of where 
and how to look systematically and empirically for insights in studying regulation. They should be 
used to help to refine and extend the methods of sociology of law; in particular, inspiring provisional 
conceptual frameworks to guide research. And such frameworks are especially important where the 
forms and conditions of regulation are rapidly changing under the impact of globalisation, 
technological change, and intensifying cultural interactions.  
 
It remains to consider some prominent elements in the contemporary agenda of socio-legal 
scholarship, and how far aspects of Petrażycki’s theories, insofar as they are accessible to an 
international audience, can relate to them. 
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PETRAŻYCKI’S RELEVANCE FOR CURRENT SOCIO-LEGAL ISSUES 
 
In the space available it is not possible to do more than identify a few themes in relation to which, it 
will be suggested, Petrażycki’s insights are relevant. After his time, sociology of law became a well-
established international research field and, as sociologically-oriented scholars have, increasingly, 
resisted tying their methods and theories exclusively to sociology (or any other social science) as a 
distinct academic discipline, a much broader idea of socio-legal studies has developed, implying a 
willingness to seek insights about the social character of law from a range of disciplines, or to resist 
any specific disciplinary allegiances.  
 
Increasingly, the impetus of socio-legal research is to observe the many forms that contemporary 
governmental regulation takes, and the variety of ways in which it is experienced. Socio-legal 
research today studies the social effects of legal regulation and the social conditions that produce it, 
the experience of those subject to it and those who invoke it, and the practices and procedures of the 
agencies that create, interpret and enforce it. Some such research focuses entirely on the law of the 
state while other research adopts a pluralist view, finding law, as Petrażycki did, in many social 
settings not addressed by state law. 
 
Three developments that have attracted the attention of contemporary socio-legal scholars seem to me 
to be especially significant in considering Petrażycki today. They are (i) the dominance of 
instrumental conceptions of law, (ii) the impact, in most complex modern societies, of cultural 
pluralism or multiculturalism and (iii) the growth of transnational law and new forms of international 
law. In what follows each of these will be discussed in turn, relating them to Petrażycki’s work. 
 
 
Legal instrumentalism and the ethical worth of law 
 
Modern socio-legal research over the past half century has largely presumed – and been strongly 
promoted by – an instrumental view of law. That is to say, law has been generally treated, not 
necessarily by jurists but usually by legislators and administrators, as an instrument of government; a 
means of framing and implementing policy, setting social goals, encouraging and regulating economic 
life, and shaping desirable behaviour by citizens. Alongside this it has often been treated as a private 
resource: an instrument available to citizens, corporations and others to promote and secure their 
interests, if necessary through litigation. Socio-legal scholarship in general can be said to have 
adopted this instrumental approach to law as its dominant, if often implicit outlook on the nature of 
law (Cotterrell, 2009a, pp. 488-91). On this basis Western socio-legal research has flourished as a 
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support for legal policy, especially in combating racial and sex discrimination, and in economic 
regulation, the organisation of welfare provision, the support of family life and the control of crime. 
 
It is hard to deny the usefulness of empirical research on the effects of legal policy in these and other 
areas. Research has often identified what Roscoe Pound (1917) called ‘the limits of effective legal 
action’ and the conditions under which law can and cannot achieve the results envisaged by 
lawmakers. But a purely instrumental view of law can also be criticised. To treat law as no more than 
an instrument is to ignore the question of whether law should have qualities that allow it to flourish as 
a valuable cultural phenomenon in itself, rather than merely for what it may be used to achieve. 
Petrażycki saw the imperative-attributive character of law as valuable in this way. The consciousness 
of rights would be a means of entrenching in individuals a sense of dignity and self-respect and the 
firmness, confidence, energy and initiative ‘essential for life’.7 Thus, if the legal experience of right 
and duty is well organised in its social settings it can serve not merely pragmatic or short-term 
governmental or private aims but a larger ethical purpose. The development of a general legal 
consciousness has, so it seems, a cultural value in itself. On this Petrażycki is explicit – law can be a 
powerful educative force as well as a motivating force. In terms that few modern scholars would 
dream of using, Petrażycki suggests that law can, indeed, make us ethically better people. 
 
It is easy to mock such claims. Many decades of empirical research have shown the limits of law’s 
ability to achieve intended effects and there is strong resistance in socio-legal scholarship to moral 
prescriptions of any kind. But one can also note in the literature urgent criticisms of the excesses of 
legal instrumentalism, on the basis that this can make law seem no more than a weapon available to be 
used in socially irresponsible ways by any person or agency able to gain control of it (see e.g. 
Tamanaha, 2006). The image of the lawyer as amoral ‘hired gun’ is very familiar. Petrażycki was in 
no way opposed to the use of law as an instrument of policy – indeed he pioneered the project of a 
‘science of legal policy’ and developed this idea extensively (Babb, 1937; Gorecki, 1975). But his 
image of what legal policy could be goes so far beyond the assumptions of contemporary socio-legal 
research as to seem, at first, shockingly naïve or bizarre.  
 
He sees law’s ultimate task as to promote ‘the complete dominance of active love’.8 What this means 
in essence is the promotion of a social life characterised by solidarity, altruism, active citizenship, 
public spiritedness and social responsibility. Law, in this view, is to shape not only behaviour 
(through incentives and penalties) but also character (by inculcating experiences of duty and 
entitlement). These are long-term aims for law but they set immediate challenges: for example, to 
                                                     
7
 Petrażycki (1955, pp. 88-9). For some closely related ideas see Jhering (1915). 
8
 Babb (1937, p. 810). The idea reflects wider currents of thought in the Russia of Petrażycki’s time, and it 
became, in effect, the central focus of Pitirim Sorokin’s sociology (as ‘Amitology’) in the last phase of 
Sorokin’s career in the United States. See e.g. Johnston (1998, pp. 5, 42-9). 
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make official (state) law as understandable and accessible to the citizen as possible, to adapt it 
carefully to the psyche of those subject to it, to make it vivid and clear through factual illustrations, 
and to enforce it firmly and consistently; the ultimate aim of legal policy is to make official law 
increasingly unnecessary insofar as the ethical regulation of social life becomes more effective (Babb, 
1937, pp. 810, 826-8).  
 
Petrażycki’s extensive work on the science of legal policy is hardly represented in the English 
translations of his work. But indications of its content, insofar as they are available to this writer, 
suggest that it points to ideas largely absent from, but an important supplement to, those that inspire 
much contemporary socio-legal research; one of its important messages for today seems to be that 
socio-legal studies should link their existing concerns about the effectiveness of legislation and the 
legal experience of citizens to a wider sense of law’s potential moral meaning.9 It implies the need for 
renewed attention to the often neglected expressive functions of law – attention not restricted merely 
to this function in the context of criminal law. At a time when law is often seen as a mere technical 
calculus, divorced from the moral experience of citizens, Petrażycki’s voice from a century ago insists 
that studies of law in action can and should be guided by a vision of what an ethical life and a well-
organised society might be. 
 
How far can the vigorous assertion of rights really be seen in contemporary conditions as means of 
promoting ethical life in a society?  Emile Durkheim drew an important distinction between what he 
called egoism (the selfish assertion of right to promote only one’s private interests) and individualism 
(a moral position characterised by respect for and willingness to defend the rights of all individuals to 
their personal autonomy and dignity, no less than to defend one’s own such rights) (Cotterrell 1999: 
112-13). Hence, this moral individualism recognises an obligation to the rights of others as a basis for 
defence of one’s own rights. The mere assertion of one’s own rights without concern for others does 
not promote ethical life in any sense, on this view. In itself, such conduct has no ethical value to the 
individual or moral worth to society. What then is to be made of Petrażycki’s enthusiasm for the 
active assertion of rights? 
 
A Petrażyckian concept of law treats the experience of right or entitlement and that of duty or 
obligation as inseparable (Petrażycki, 1955, p. 46), as two sides of the psychological impulse to which 
the word ‘law’ refers. Current juristic thought often puts strong emphasis on the securing of private 
rights (especially of property) as the primary purpose of law, alongside the guaranteeing of basic 
personal security. But the very structure of Petrażycki’s imperative-attributive concept of law suggests 
that the sense of obligation is as fundamental as that of entitlement. The recognition of duty by one 
                                                     
9
 For somewhat related ideas about the expressive, communicative and rhetorical potential of reflexive 
legislation in a dialogue with societal values, see the thoughtful discussion in Witteveen (2005). 
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person does not seem, in this conceptual architecture, to be the mere consequence of the assertion of 
right by another; the recognition of duty can equally be seen as the psychological experience that, in 
law, allows rights in others to exist. One might also say that although the sense of right or entitlement 
is what gives law the special quality that distinguishes it from morality, this sense gains its truly 
‘legal’ quality only because it also embodies a typically moral experience of prescribed duty. The 
attributive (sense of right) and imperative (subjection to duty) elements in law are experienced as one.  
 
It is surely this quality of law which, for Petrażycki, can make it valuable in itself, independently of its 
instrumental value. It makes possible legal relationships as social relationships. This is not to confuse 
law with morality, or to imagine that law is always (or even often) intuitively experienced as morally 
good; it is merely to note that as psychic phenomena law and morality are closely related, especially 
when understood as expressions of a vibrant culture. 
 
 
Cultural pluralism, intuitive law, positive law 
 
Some eighty years ago, praising Petrażycki’s emphasis on legal pluralism, Gurvitch (1935, p. 164) 
noted the emergence of many new forms of regulation that it was becoming hard for jurists to ignore – 
legal institutions outside the scope of state law, but existing inside national society as well as in the 
international sphere. In the national sphere he mentioned the regulation of working practices produced 
in enterprises through processes of industrial democracy. Today we might think especially of the 
demands of minority cultural groups for legal recognition of their religious or traditional norms.  
 
Throughout much of Western Europe the issue of the female Muslim veil – the right to wear it, or a 
legal duty not to do so in certain contexts, has attracted a huge literature (e.g. Ferrari and Pastorelli 
eds., 2013). More broadly, the claims of many Muslims in Britain and elsewhere to have some 
effective legal recognition of their distinctive practices – for example, of marriage, divorce, 
inheritance and commerce – have led to unending debate. They have also often posed difficult 
problems for state courts faced with the need to apply official law (in Petrażycki’s sense) to situations 
and practices already shaped and given meaning by other kinds of legal ideas. These are often ideas 
derived from interpretations of Islamic Shari’a law or from customary practices of particular cultural 
groups within the larger national society.  
 
A persistent question in much discussion has been how far these ideas, which may possess great 
authority and be firmly applied in the groups that recognise them, should be generally accepted as 
‘law’. If so, what kind of law would this be? What would be its relation to official state law? How 
could its status as law be understood? By whom should it be accepted as law? What situation exists if 
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some groups in the national society consider it legal, but others do not? What happens if it is 
inconsistent (perhaps irreconcilable) with state law? 
 
Such matters are increasingly ones for everyday juristic practice. State law in Western societies may, 
for example, refuse to recognise polygamous marriages, but how should it deal with the position of 
wives married and divorced from polygamous marriages when, being dependent and perhaps 
destitute, they seek financial support from their former husbands?  Should state law ignore their 
situation? More generally, how can state law purport to regulate family life in communities where 
couples marry (and perhaps divorce) under the authority of religious law but not state law? 
Petrażycki’s legal theory allows the organisation of such issues in terms of law, cutting through the 
limitations of a rigid demarcation between state law and all other forms of authoritative social 
regulation. The claim of the deserted polygamous wife, even if not based on an appeal to religion or 
custom, can be interpreted in terms of intuitive law (a sense of justice). But it may well be a claim that 
refers to the ‘normative fact’ of religious or customary authority. As such it is a claim of positive law, 
irrespective of whether the state recognises it. In Britain, Muslim arbitration bodies decide family 
cases brought before them on the basis of their interpretations of religious and customary sources and 
in an effort to find reasonable solutions consistent with the expectations of the communities they seek 
to serve. In practice, in these conditions, it is possible to observe, co-existing, all of Petrażycki’s types 
of law (various kinds of official and unofficial, positive and intuitive law, and their combinations).  
 
And Petrażycki’s idea of legal policy might suggest some particular responsibilities of official law: to 
encourage conditions in which all individuals can flourish, their sense of social responsibility as active 
citizens is promoted, and communication and solidarity between communities in the larger society as 
well as within them is promoted. Petrażycki’s legal pluralist conceptions may not solve regulatory 
problems. However they make it possible to see that a radical, irresolvable conflict between different 
and exclusive conceptions of ‘law’ can be replaced by a single perspective – one that accepts the co-
existence of a variety of distinct types of law and the need to facilitate their stable interaction or 
interrelation. This implies that the relative authority of different kinds of law has to be recognised and 
negotiated so that society can be regulated in a practical, effective, socially meaningful way.  
 
A critic of this approach might say that it is unimportant whether the conflicts and interrelations of 
regulatory regimes and aspirations are thought of as problems of legal pluralism or simply of 
normative pluralism. Are the problems made any easier by particular choices made in applying the 
word ‘law’? The real issue is the clash of expectations as to what regulation is to be applied to 
particular problems. Whether or not regulation is called law by jurists or legal theorists may not alter 
popular convictions as to whether the regulation should be applied to cases that concern them. The 
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activity of defining should not be confused with empirical study of conditions defined.
10
 As argued 
earlier, a socio-legal perspective should not become entangled in efforts to produce a conclusive 
definition of what counts as law, as contrasted with non-legal regulation. 
 
However, Petrażycki’s radical reconceptualization of law, extending it to embrace much that jurists 
serving state legal systems would not accept as law, may make it possible to reconsider issues of 
normative (or legal) pluralism in some illuminating ways. In particular, it shifts focus from the 
positivist position of seeking to identify particular social sources (e.g. legislative procedures, judicial 
decisions) that determine whether or not a norm is valid law. Such a positivist position often provides 
no useful answers in cases where popular opinion refuses to accept that the linking of norms to such 
identified sources is the only conclusive way of attributing operative authority to them. Equally, legal 
positivism provides no adequate answers where regulatory regimes are in conflict and competing 
social sources of validity can be identified, with no established hierarchy of importance accepted as 
between these sources.  
 
A Petrażyckian approach would focus not on identifying ‘pedigree tests’ of what is to count as legal 
or non-legal by looking to see what social sources the regulation in question has been brought into 
being. Instead it would focus on the subjective experience of those who encounter the regulation. It 
would not need to treat as irrelevant the sense of the ‘legal’ held by those who experience, as law, 
types of regulation that the state does not recognise. It would presumably seek to understand the 
phenomenon ‘law’ at least partly in terms of their legal aspirations and their sense of what for them is 
authoritative regulation. It would not see the problem of regulating as one of demanding acceptance of 
the state’s legal prescriptions irrespective of citizens’ understandings (or, conversely, of accepting 
those understandings as the only legitimate basis of state law), but of appreciating, negotiating, 
influencing and organising citizens’ complex and often contradictory senses of legal authority. 
 
Petrażycki’s approach to law appears to downgrade state law to merely one kind of law among many 
– a radicalism that may seem highly dangerous. Yet we should recall that in Russia he was a jurist 
serving the official law of a huge multi-cultural empire. It may be that his approach is best seen, like 
that of his contemporary, the pioneer legal sociologist Eugen Ehrlich (Cotterrell, 2009b), as aiming to 
protect the state from itself; that is, from its own regulatory hubris, and from isolation and alienation 
from the perceptions of citizens. It would do this by encouraging a view of law that is sufficiently 
wide to allow the jurist (who is professionally committed to the idea of law) to see the realm of state 
law as if ‘from the outside’ – that is, from the imagined standpoints of citizens who recognise many 
kinds of intuitive, positive, official and unofficial law. In this kaleidoscope of many kinds of legal 
                                                     
10
 As it was once memorably put, ‘Who likes may snip verbal definitions in his old age, when his world has 
gone crackly and dry.’ (Bentley (1908/1995, p. 199). 
16 
 
experience, the experience of positive law held in place by the state is just one element. This does not 
mean that it must be seen as in any way a minor element; rather it should be continually confronted 
with (and enriched in) a larger regulatory environment that is not rendered juristically redundant 
simply by having been denied a priori – by definitional fiat – the designation ‘law’. 
 
 
The nature and authority of transnational regulation 
 
Petrażycki recognised international law as a reality but he could hardly have envisaged the vast range 
of different regimes of regulation that exist today in, for example, international trade law, 
international criminal justice, international human rights, international financial regulation and 
European Union law. International law is no longer necessarily confined to regulating the relations of 
states. It can also often directly address individuals (as, for example, in the prosecution of offenders in 
international criminal law) or indirectly shape the conditions in which they live and work, as in the 
case of international economic law, such as that of the World Trade Organisation. Much new legal 
regulation can be considered not only as governing relations between states but also as operating 
across, or irrespective of state boundaries: it is often called transnational law (Cotterrell, 2012).  
 
Some of it arises from treaties or conventions between states, some from national laws that have effect 
extraterritorially, some from the creative activity of transnational networks of community such as the 
business networks in which international commercial arbitration (the new lex mercatoria) has 
developed, some from international agencies (such as the World Trade Organisation or the 
International Criminal Court) claiming independence from specific national allegiances, and some 
from within transnational professions, industries or interest groups defining ‘best practice’ through 
authorities which they support to set uniform standards.  
 
The growing importance of transnational law (and, in some cases, its controversial character as ‘law’) 
raises the question of whether Petrażycki’s legal pluralism can help in analysing this phenomenon. 
Much transnational law is not official (state) law in his sense and yet it is sometimes applied by 
officially recognised institutions (international courts; regulatory agencies; standard-setting bodies). It 
is often created and imposed ‘top-down’ on those it regulates. But some of it is created ‘bottom-up’ 
through the interactions of those for whom it is useful (transnational traders, financiers, internet 
technologists, etc.) as what is sometimes called ‘transnational private law’ (Calliess and Zumbansen, 
2010). What seems to be emerging is not a single new transnational realm of law but a multitude of 
legal regimes claiming different kinds of authority, arising from different sources and regulating in 
different ways. 
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Petrażycki’s legal theory teaches that many forms of positive law can exist outside state law. This 
makes it possible to portray the entire complex universe of transnational law as an array of different 
kinds of positive law. And if, as Sorokin argued, Petrażycki’s theory shows adequately how law as a 
trans-subjective social form can arise from the harmonisation of individual psychological experiences, 
it is not difficult to see how legal structures can arise through interaction in social groups and 
networks and the common recognition of normative facts as the basis of positive law. The varieties of 
transnational positive law created in this way may have different kinds of relationships with state law.  
 
By separating the idea of positive law from that of official state law Petrażycki moves us past 
unhelpful debates as to what kinds of transnational regulation should be recognised as law. Instead, 
the issues become: how do these different kinds of law relate, from where do they derive their ethical 
meaning as structures of rights and duties, what gives them authority over those they are supposed to 
regulate? Ultimately, the key juristic question is: how is their relative authority – their authority 
relative to each other – to be judged when these kinds of law clash, purporting to regulate the same 
people, or the same situations or transactions? 
 
Surely this Petrażyckian perspective is helpful. It makes possible a focus on law’s practical authority 
rather than its abstract definition. Petrażycki’s open, flexible and minimal model of law in terms of 
imperative-attributive experiences seems to undermine any assumptions that the challenges of 
normative pluralism can be dealt with simply by defining them away as outside juristic concern. 
Positivist legal theorists might adopt concepts of law that exclude from the ‘province of 
jurisprudence’ many regulatory forms and normative ideas now populating the socio-legal world that 
do not correspond with orthodox conceptions of state law. But Petrażycki shows that law can be 
thought of coherently in ways that do not depend on the concepts that have traditionally served to 
police the boundaries of the juridical world. This was surely the scandal of his theory in his own day, 
and it remains so in today. The socio-legal realm does not need positivist juristic theory to mark out 
what is to count as law within it, though it should take account of the ideas offered by that theory. The 
freedom to think about legal development inside but also beyond orthodox juristic categories is a main 
legacy of Petrażycki for scholars seeking to understand evolving forms and characteristics of 
transnational law. 
 
However, it is still important to bear in mind Sorokin’s claim that important questions are not 
satisfactorily solved by Petrażycki’s psychological theory. Some of these seem to be about the 
authority of official (publicly organised or recognised) legal agencies. What Petrażycki calls official 
law (law ‘to be applied and sustained by representatives of the state authority’) is often remote from 
individual citizens. Although they may recognise the normative facts that authorise it (and so they 
experience it as positive law), those normative facts are not necessarily (or even typically) their own 
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choices. Certainly, the psychological theory of law may show how some law can take social form as a 
development from the legal experiences of individuals interacting and communicating with each 
other. But it is surely important to ask sociologically how official law exerts its ‘psychical effects’ 
(Pałecki, 1984, p. 137, quoting Petrażycki), how it gains coercive power over individuals who have 
had little influence on its creation, and how the authority of the state comes into being, is sustained, 
and in various conditions is challenged or overthrown.  
 
Official law, wrote the legal realist Karl Olivecrona bluntly (1948, p. 178), ‘cannot be reduced to 
psychical experiences, to “law-convictions”’. However, it might be more accurate to say that it cannot 
usually be reduced to those of citizens in general.
11
 Its nature requires sociological explanation. If 
these issues are pertinent to state law, they may be even more so for the kinds of transnational law that 
are created by agreement between states (treaties, conventions) – processes in which most citizens are 
even less involved. In sociological terms the problem is one of ‘moral distance’ between official law-
makers and law enforcers and those whom they seek to regulate. 
 
It is not possible here to say more than that these issues remain unresolved, on the basis of the 
materials available. It seems that the following conclusion can be reached. Petrażycki’s theory points 
towards the important idea that a great deal of transnational law might be understood as created in 
transnational communication between individuals in groups, organisations and networks. This 
interaction and communication gives rise to various kinds of positive law as sociocultural phenomena. 
So, transnational law as a social form can be produced ‘bottom up’ in such a way. Thus, it is easy to 
see where the source of its authority lies. We might say it lies in the culture of those who interact to 
create it; it can be said that it has cultural legitimacy. But the problem of where ‘top-down’ law (such 
as much international law created by conventions) gets adequate authority to achieve widespread 
recognition and wide-ranging effects as social regulation seems to remain (Cotterrell, 2013). Where 
does the law-making authority, for example, of the World Trade Organisation, lie? Why, by whom, 
under what conditions, and with what limitations, is such international regulation experienced as 
positive law in Petrażycki’s sense? Must it be seen as having only a relatively weak political 
legitimacy so that it is experienced as law only by the relatively few officials directly involved with it, 
but has little or no resonance in the legal consciousness of most of those who live within the 
jurisdictions it addresses?  
 
Does, then, top-down, cross-border law-making depend entirely on the support of the governments of 
nation states that authorise international law-making institutions or international judicial processes? If 
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 Pałecki (1984, p. 150). For example, it might represent only the law-convictions of its creators. Claims have 
been made that Petrażycki’s (social) category of official law cannot be derived from his (individualistic) 
psychological definition of law: see Motyka (2007, p. 37); Motyka (2006); Peczenik (1975, p. 94). 
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so, the authority supporting it is not culturally-based but technical-political. But contemporary 
transnational regulation in general seems dependent for its stability on uneasy, shifting combinations 
of cultural and political sources of authority. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because much of Petrażycki’s work remains untranslated and so inaccessible to most international 
scholars it is impossible for them to draw firm conclusions with any confidence about the overall 
significance of his theories. At best, his available writings can be treated as suggestive, as a store of 
extremely imaginative ideas about law that imply fruitful avenues for contemporary theoretical 
development, for example on the topics discussed in this article. But there is no doubt that, if more of 
his extensive scholarship could be made available to international scholars, more productive debate 
around his ideas would be possible. To achieve this, it would be very desirable to have more of his 
writings translated into English.  
 
Petrażycki certainly suffered both during his lifetime and posthumously as a consequence of the 
accidents of history. Uprooted from pre-revolutionary Russia where he had been a dominant 
intellectual force and one of the most celebrated jurists of his day, he found his career almost entirely 
driven off-course after the Bolshevik revolution and his subsequent relocation to Poland. Thereafter 
the political and cultural crises and divisions of twentieth century Europe and the dislocations of war 
surely further hampered the development and long-term reception of his thought. However, such of 
his work as is internationally available, together with the many informative and accessible 
commentaries on his ideas,
12
 should make it possible for scholars to recognise more widely something 
of the scale of his great achievement as a theorist of law. This article has examined various 
specifically intellectual obstacles that, in the past, may have limited his international influence. 
However, the main purpose here has been to suggest that, a century after he wrote, Petrażycki’s 
thought continues to offer valuable insights that can inform debate around some of the most pressing 
contemporary issues in socio-legal studies. 
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